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Abstract - Hunting and game-preservation are 
interrelated. There are two fundamental traditions in 
the legislation on hunting property rights: the Romanic 
tradition and the Germanic one, with different 
consequences in terms of resources use and 
conservation. 
The Economic Theory of Common Resources has been 
applied to provide conclusions about the management 
and conservation of hunting resources. In this paper, we 
derive a model of hunting management, adapting the 
Gordon/Schaefer fisheries model. The conclusions of the 
model are confronted with Portuguese hunting 
regulation.  
 




Hunting (whether for food or for sport) marked 
all the periods of History, in all latitudes, cultures and 
civilisations (Carmo, 2000). But the traditional 
obscurity of this sector leads to the relative poor 
attention, in the context of the Natural Resource and 
Environmental Economics: despite the social and 
economic importance of the sector in countries like 
Portugal, the literature on hunting is scarce.  
In a relevant paper from the 90s, Hasenkamp 
(1995) derived a model of hunting management and 
conservation and concluded that hunting and game-
preservation were interrelated: hunting must respect 
the intentions of game-preservation, and game-
preservation must rely on hunting as one method to 
achieve its intentions. In the paper, the Economic 
Theory of Common Resources is applied to the 
problem to provide conclusions. What is curious is 
that these conclusions are reflected in the existing 
relevant legal hunting setting in Germany. That is, 
German Law contains regulation that confronts the 
hunter with the objectives of hunting preservation 
and held him the responsibility for pursuing these 
goals.  
By the contrary, in Portugal (and other Latin 
countries), the fundamental debate in this domain 
always turn around the overexploitation of hunting 
resources and the dissatisfaction of hunters with 
hunting regulation, especially with that relates to 
hunting property-rights and access conditions to 
hunting grounds. 
Our issues are the following: What are the 
differences between Portuguese regulation and the 
Germanic one? With respect to hunting regulation, is 
the legislator confronted with different conceptions or 
principles? What difference does it make? What are 
the economical effects of this possible distinct legal 
tradition? 
The structure of the paper is the following:  
First, we compare two conceptions of hunting 
property rights: the Roman conception and the 
German conception.   
Then, we derive a model of hunting management 
and conservation. Analysis of the model leads us to 
conclude about the relation between the property-
rights regimes and the efficient use of hunting 
resources.  
Finally discussion of Portuguese hunting 
regulation takes us to conclude about our Roman 
tradition and hunting management consequences. 
2. Romanic Versus Germanic Legal 
Tradition 
Ortega y Gasset formulated the hypothesis of 
being printed, in the man's sub-conscience, his hunter 
past.  
The juridical evolution of the property-rights 
regimes of hunting and the discipline demanded for 
the activity can help to understand the attitudes of the 
legislator and the proposed regulation. Along the 
centuries, two systems, or conceptions, about hunting 
property-rights, were confronted: the Roman 
conception and the Germanic conception.  
The Roman conception states that the wild 
animals constitute res nullius, things without owner 
that all men can appropriate by ocupatio, the only 
title of property acquisition on the hunted wild 
animal. To this conception, the classification of free 
land implicates that the hunter has the freedom of 
access to the hunting resources in other’s land, 
although respecting imposed norms.  
Of course, as the agriculture was organised, the 
idea of game reserve appeared. And, as a 
consequence, the twin idea of extending an 
ownership right to the wild animals living in 
someone’s land was developed. But, indifferent to 
such habits, the Roman law maintained to the whole 
wild animal the consideration of freely access. The 
property of the wild animal owes to the hunter who 
captured it, to the land’s owner being just reserved 
the right of excluding others from hunting in their 
lands. It’s the recognition of “res- nullius” nature of 
hunting resources and hunt as a national value. 
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This attitude is understandable. Romans saw the 
activity in a circus perspective. This attitude made 
hunting a “frivolous” occupation, not an economic 
activity. Hunting was identified with the imperial 
virtues of physical and paramilitary education. 
Hunting, horse-seated, was a distinctive form of the 
resistance to the barbarian activity of hunting “as 
massacre” (Carmo, 2000). This vision was 
incompatible with the private property. On the 
contrary, it suggested a noble fight between the man 
and the wild nature. And, only if nature was 
identified with something of absolutely free, this fight 
made sense in ethic terms. 
The Germanic conception considers the right of 
hunting due to a privilege (feudal type) of the 
landlord. Hunting right is clearly linked to the 
property right on land. The landowner is entitled of 
disposing of what is “his property”, including the 
hunt.  
There has been an important debate among 
defenders of the two conceptions.  
The defenders of the Roman regime oppose the 
argument that the Germanic conception is artificial in 
its foundations. It does not solve the management and 
conservation problem in the areas of small property 
because the hunt has natural mobility and can be born 
and feed in a hunting ground, live in another and be 
captured elsewhere. So, the determination of the 
property is impossible.  
They also argue that, to be applied with the 
whole rigidity, this conception would result in the 
complete extinction of all the free lands, transforming 
the territory in an immense game reserve where the 
hunters without land would not have access. This 
could be identified as a “true abuse of right”. In the 
extreme situation, the “owner” could impede the 
access and could, also, destroy or take advantage of 
the resources, attempting against a public wealth that 
imported to safeguard. So, the Government must 
limit such ends. 
By the contrary, the Romanic conception sees 
hunt as a common, res-nullius good; the property 
right appears in the own moment of the capture. This 
conception has, to its favour, some arguments of 
value: 
 The mobility of the hunt inter-properties as a gift 
of nature;  
 The private property carries out a social function 
and it can be the case that the Government wants 
the landowners to support the social costs of 
creating the species destined to collective use. 
The defenders of the German conception put in 
evidence the problem of the conservation of the 
species. The rationale of this argument approaches, in 
essence, the theoretical economic discussion of the 
Natural Resource Economics when approaching the 
Common Property problem and the so-called 
“Tragedy of the Commons”. The exploitation in 
regime of open access will lead, unavoidably, to the 
situation of overexploitation of the resources, due to 
the non-existence, or vague stance, of property rights. 
On the contrary, to the defenders of the 
privatisation of hunting, the optimal solution can 
arise by trusting in the private owner interest. 
Landowners will use the resources in an inter-
temporal logic that intends to maximise the present 
value of benefit stream of hunting, along the time. In 
his land, each landlord can work as a “sole owner” 
promoting the efficiency in the resource exploitation 
and conservation.  
This is what we intend to demonstrate with the 
formal bioeconomic model of hunting management 
that we develop and present in the next point. 
3. A Model of Hunting Management 
To suit the purpose of modelling hunting 
activities and exploring the issues of hunting 
resources management and conservation, Hasenkamp 
(1995) adapted the model of Dasgupta and Heal 
(1979). 
Our proposal is different. We adapt the 
Gordon/Schaefer model. Becoming from Fisheries 
Economics, this is a very useful model to explain the 
market characteristics and agents behaviour, in the 
general common property case. 
In this presentation we only approach the static 
version of the model to highlight the fundaments of 
hunting mismanagement when we consider the open 
access situation. A dynamic version of the model – 
forthcoming - will help, also, the correct explanation 
of possible regulation solutions for the common 
property problem. These economic tools switch, in its 
essence, the traditional answers, to the externalities 
problem, of Pigou and Coase. 
The central point in the Gordon (1954) paper is 
that fish are difficult to observe (except upon capture) 
and mobile (often travelling great distances). 
Consequently, these resources have provided 
excellent examples of resources in which the costs of 
attempting to establish property rights are perceived 
as exceeding, by a wide margin, the benefits that 
might be derived there from.  
Gordon argues that, if a common property fishery 
is subject to no government regulation and the fishing 
industry is competitive, there will be inevitable 
market failure: the fishery will be expanded to the 
point that economic overfishing and overcapacity will 
occur (Munro, 1982).  
The similarities with the hunting case are 
obvious.  
Suppose a large area, for example, a 
municipality. We assume that the disposable land is 
subject to two different activities: agricultural use and 
hunting. 
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If we want to design an acceptable economic 
model of hunting, we must introduce, in its 
foundation, a biological model of hunting resources 
growth. 
In the Gordon article, the underlying biological 
foundation is a variant of Schaefer (1957) model. In 
our model, the populations’ dynamics can, also, be 
easily described with a “Macro-Biological 
Approach”. A hunting resource population or 
biomass will, if not subject to human capture, grow, 
in terms of weight, both as a consequence of the 
recruitment of new individuals and as the result of the 
growth of individual wild animals in the population. 
Natural mortality will act as a check on growth. If we 
assume stable environmental conditions (especially, 
if we do not introduce men as predators), along the 
time, the biomass will approach a natural equilibrium 
level at which net growth is zero. 
If we do not attempt to distinguish among the 
factors influencing net growth, the growth of the 
biomass can be viewed as a function of the biomass 
itself, and the population dynamics can be modelled 






   
x denotes the biomass and G (x) represents the 
regeneration capacity associated with every level of 
the stock. 
The relation between the rate of growth and the 
level of the stock is not monotonic. As in the 
Schaefer model, we’ll have a quadratic function: 
 
G (x) = r x (1- x/K) 
 
K denotes the carrying capacity and r, constant, 
denotes the intrinsic growth rate.  
When integrated, we are facing the popular 
Lotka/Volterra logistic equation of population 
dynamics. 
When we introduce the men action of 
capture/hunting, the first equation is modified: 
 
dx/dt = G (x) – H (t) 
 
H (t) denotes the hunting rate. 
The hunting production function is given by: 
 
H (t) = h F(t) x(t) 
 
F(t) denotes the venation/hunting effort at time t 
(a kind of “capital-jelly” measure of the flow of 
labour and capital services devoted to hunting 
activities; this could be evaluated, for example, in 
terms of hunting hours), and h, constant, denotes a 
capture-ability coefficient measuring the different 
capture conditions between hunting grounds. 
If the resources are being captured in a 
sustainable basis, then dx/dt = 0 and H (t) = G(x).  
Hence, G(x) can be viewed as the sustainable 
yield associated with a given biomass level. This also 
drives us to the well-known “Maximum Sustainable 
Yield” Principle proposed by biologists as an 
orientation rule for resource use. The growth rate is a 
quadratic function. So, there is a stock where the 
regeneration capacity is maximised, and that is the 
stock that makes possible to maintain indefinitely a 
maximum capture rate. The management objective 
should be to drive the biomass to that level and, 
afterwards, to capture, every year, the associated 
growth of the stock. 
Since H (t) is a function of F, as well as x, one 
can establish the sustainable yield/ venation effort 
relationship: Y =  F -  F2, 
Y denotes sustainable physical yield, with  =h 
K and  = h2 K/r. 
In fact, if capture is taking place on a sustainable 
basis we have:  
h Fx = G(x)  and  h F x = r x (1-x/K).   
Then, we can derive the expression x = K (1-h/r 
F) and, by substitution, we find an equation 
expressing sustainable yield as a function of F:  
Y = h F K (1-h/r F) = h K F – (h2K/r) F2  
  With the biological model complete, we can 
introduce prices and costs.  
We assume that both the demand for captured 
hunting resources and the supply of hunting effort are 
perfectly elastic. 
The cost function can be expressed as the simple 
equation: 
 
C = c F   
 
We assume that the total cost is linear with effort. 
The constant c denotes unit cost of effort. 
Sustainable revenue is represented by pY, where 
p is the unit price of hunting. It has, also, a quadratic 
form. Note that total cost is to be interpreted as the 
total cost of capturing the sustainable yield. 
We can now solve, graphically, the model and 
analyse the behaviour of the “industry” (see Figure 
1):   




The main conclusions are: 
 If hunting was managed by a “sole owner” , the 
hunting would be stabilised at the point where 
sustainable resource rent (sustainable revenue 
less total cost) is maximised, that is, F0. In this 
situation, hunting resources are managed in a 
socially optimal manner and, at that point, the 
marginal cost and the value of the marginal 
product of venation effort are equal. If hunting 
effort expands beyond F0, overexploitation of the 
resources occurs. 
 If hunting activities take place in a regime of 
Open Access, that is, in a res nullius basis, and if 
hunting is unregulated and competitive, there is 
no landlord to appropriate the resource rents 
generated by hunting. Thus, if hunting was at the 
point where resource rents are maximised, F0, the 
“industry” would be enjoying super-normal 
returns and new hunters would be attracted to 
enter the hunting ground. Hunting effort will 
expand, leading to overexploitation of biomass. 
In this case, hunting would not be in equilibrium 
until it had expanded to the point where total 
costs are equal to total revenues, that is, until 
resource rent had been fully dissipated. At this 
point, F∞, the marginal social cost is different 
from private marginal cost. This “bionomic 
equilibrium” (as Gordon used to call it) reflects 
the existence of externalities in the hunting 
process, and it’s a case of market failure. 
Note, also, that even the principle of “full 
resource utilisation”, proposed by the biologists, is, 
possibly, less-conservationist than it is pretended 
(and needed). In fact, the level of venation effort 
associated with maximum sustainable yield (FMSY) 
can be higher than the effort associated with the 
“economic optimum” (F0). 
The central idea can be stated as follows:  
In conditions of free access and competition the 
market leads to non-optimal solutions in resource use. 
The “res nullius” nature of the property-rights regime 
and the presence of externalities in the capture, and 
their effects, especially the complete dissipation of 
resource rents and the dynamic effects on the stocks, 
lead to market equilibrium solutions that implicate 
overexploitation and overcapacity.  
There is nothing like an “invisible hand”, in such 
case. Some kind of regulation is needed. Agents must 
internalise the external effects. Otherwise resources 
will be overexploited and, perhaps, irreversibly 
becoming extinct. In this sense, it seems that the 
followers of German conception are in the right side. 
But of course there are also other dimensions of the 
problem that must be discussed. One of them is the 
equity issue. 
4. The Portuguese Case 
The Portuguese case is curious. Hunting was 
always practised in Portugal and covered by the Latin 
jurisprudence, although hunt resources have been 
considered as inherent to the land’s domain. To this 
jurisprudence wild animals are things without owner 
that all men can appropriate by ocupatio. This is the 
only title of acquisition of the property on the hunt.  
This tradition of open access is the root-cause of 
hunting depletion. But, at the same time, the 
legislator sees it as a form of giving the hunters 
without land the possibility of enjoying this activity. 
This is compatible with the Portuguese tradition that 
attributes something like a universal privilege to the 
right of hunting. Our legislators wrapped up in the 
discussion between Romanic and Germanic 
conceptions. The confrontation between the 
defenders of these regimes impresses because it’s a 
case of a country where the tradition of “the freedom 
of hunting” almost attributed a personality right to 
the right of hunting. That is, the issue of equity is also 
considered in the Portuguese legislation. In fact, the 
capacity of entering one’s land only to capture wild 
animals which “have no owner, only pertaining to 
Free Nature”, give the common people/hunter the 
sensation that they are equal face to the gifts of 
Nature. 
Note also that the Portuguese tradition is, 
obviously, Roman, but it doesn't stop revealing 
interesting and original signs.  
After some original mixtures (even introducing 
some reserve areas), with the approval of the Civil 
Code of Seabra (1868) the Romanic tradition was 
absorbed in a very clear mode. In the title I (article 
383) and in the title III (of the territory occupation), 
hunting is designed as res-nullius. The Code settles 
down the legal principle that “it is bid to all, without 
distinction, to hunt the wild animals, in conformity 
with the administrative regulations that determine the 
way and the time of hunting”.  
The article 388 of the Code recognised the 
property-right to the hunter, after having captured the 
animal. But, the hunting sector was complemented 
later with hunting regulation, national and municipal 
regulations, consisting of hunting seasons, 
prohibitions of destruction of nests and habitats, 
fines, and so on. 
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The actual Portuguese Hunting Law (1999) is a 
compromise between the Roman tradition and the 
necessity of hunting preservation.  
In the context of evident overexploitation of 
hunting resources, the legislator maintained the free 
access principle in the so–called municipal hunting 
zones. This principal is also guaranteed in the 
designed national hunting zones but, for these areas, 
the fundamental characteristic is the state 
management with conservation and scientific 
research purposes. 
At the same time, the hunting legislation created 
associative and tourism-hunting zones where the 
access rules are restricted. The objective is to held the 
hunters the responsibility to achieve the objectives of 
sustainable use and protection of the species. 
Focusing on the types of property-rights relevant 
to common property (see Coelho, Filipe and Ferreira, 
2010) it seems that we are now trying a perfect 
mixture of “res-nullius”, “res-publica” and “res-
communes”.  
Especially this last proposal, switching the ideas 
of Elinor Ostrom, seems to have a great domain for 
future development. Ostrom studies are fundamental 
in the substitution of the “Tragedy” metaphor to the 
more interesting “Drama of the Commons”. Of 
course we’ll have tragedies, in the free access 
situation, but sometimes we’ll have also reasons to 
laugh. Ostrom stresses that a commons can be well 
governed and that most people, when presented with 
a resource problem, can cooperate and act for the 
common good. “Co-management” and self–
regulation are the keys for sustainable resource 
management. That is also the case for hunting. 
5. Final Remarks 
Our research suggests the following final 
remarks: 
Despite the traditional “opacity” of hunting 
world, this is a fertile field for Social Sciences 
investigation, Economics included. A fundamental 
problem stands in the fact that there is an 
“unfortunate tradition”, even in theoretical grounds, 
of failing to recognise the critical distinction between 
the true common property (res communes) and non-
property (res nullius). This situation blurs analytical 
and prescriptive clarity. Property refers not to an 
object but rather to the benefits’ stream that arises 
from its use. In the essence of property concept there 
is a social relation. So, there’s nothing inherent in the 
resource itself that determines absolutely the nature 
of the property rights. The use of the term 
“Commons”, in reference to resources as the hunting 
case, is ambiguous.  
The only thing that we can positively affirm is 
that, in conditions of open access and competition, 
the hunting market leads to non-optimal solutions in 
resource use. The “res nullius” nature of the property 
regime and the presence of externalities in the 
process of capture, lead to the complete dissipation of 
resource rents. So, the market will be driven to 
hunting equilibrium solutions that result in 
overexploitation of hunt resources and overcapacity 
(that is, “the Tragedy of the Commons”). 
Portugal has a long Roman tradition in legal 
hunting setting. This tradition of open access is the 
root-cause of hunting depletion. But the legislator 
sees it as a form of giving the hunters without land 
the possibility of enjoying this activity. This is 
compatible with the Portuguese tradition, which 
almost attributes a personality right to the right of 
hunting. The actual Portuguese Hunting Law (1999) 
is a compromise between the Roman tradition and the 
necessity of hunting preservation, maintaining 
hunting zones where the principle of free access still 
remains but creating, at the same time, other hunting 
zones where hunting rights are privatised.  
Nowadays the sector of hunting in Portugal is 
confronted with two contradictory situations. By one 
side, the number of the hunters is diminishing. From 
the beginning of the century, the sector lost almost 
90.500 hunters. The number of hunters in 2011/2012 
is 133.242. The owners of hunting licence are now 
inferior in around 5.400 than the last year. These 
hunters pay around 60 euros to get the licence. In the 
hunting season of 1999/2000 the number of hunters 
with licence was 223.740. That is, perhaps, a good 
news in terms of conservation purposes, in the sense 
that this could be interpreted as a reduction in the 
venation effort with possible better results in the 
capacity of regeneration of the species.  
But another fact is posing some doubts about the 
capacity of the sector to get a sustainable use of the 
resources (note that this sector represents potential 
revenue of 300 million euros, by year): hunters are 
getting older. For a universe of around of 287.000 
potential hunters, only 1000 have less than twenty 
years. 109.000 have already more than 61. This 
reflects the difficulties of refreshing the oldest 
generations of hunters with new hunters with skills 
and information on subjects related to the nature 
conservation and the optimal inter-temporal use of 
natural resources. 
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